The Portuguese planning for and conduct of its 1961-1974 counterinsurgency campaign in Africa.
The first comprehensive account in English of how the Portuguese Armed Forces prepared for and conducted a distant counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with very limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds for success. The Portuguese military crafted its doctrine and implemented it to match the guerrilla strategy of protracted war, and in doing so, followed the lessons gleaned from the British and French experiences in small wars. The Portuguese approach to the conflict was distinct in that it sought to combine the two-pronged national strategy of containing the cost of the war and of spreading the burden to the colonies with the solution on the battlefield. It describes how Portugal defined and analyzed its insurgency problem in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The uniqueness of its approach is highlighted through a thematic military analysis of the Portuguese effort and a comparison with the experiences of other governments fighting similar contemporaneous wars.
Foreword by General Bernard E. Trainor A Remarkable Feat of Arms Commitment to the Ultramar O Exército na Guerra Subversiva: Portuguese Counterinsurgency Doctrine on the Eve of War Portuguese Organization, Education, and Training for Counterinsurgency Portuguese Africanization of Counterinsurgency Portuguese Intelligence Network in Counterinsurgency Portuguese Approach to Mobility in Counterinsurgency Portuguese Social Operations and Aldeamentos Selected Aspects of Logistical Operations The Portuguese Way Selected Bibliography Index
Reviews Cann, who served in the Pentagon, lays out the story with an eye to contrasts with U.S. policy. His study...is concise and useful.—Choice
The book will be embraced in Portugal, where the parade of celebrations marking the five-century anniversary of Portugal's maritime expansion prepared audiences for Cann's reinterpretation of the colonial war experience in a more positive light.—African History
Endorsements This is a splendid book on a little known subject. Captain Dr. John P. Cann presents a thorough and unbiased study of the Portuguese Campaigns in Africa, 1961-1974. He read many books, examined reports, interviewed people involved in the operations and, retaining the main points, related them in an outstanding way. In the end, his book results in a comprehensive study, unparalleled by any books published in Portugal or elsewhere...Captain Dr. Cann deserves to be commended for a well-done work.—General J.M. Bethencourt Rodrigues^LFormer Army Chief of Staff, Angola^Land former Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces and Governor of Guin^D'e^R
A fascinating and comprehensive account on the Portuguese-African Campaigns...Through careful research and a balanced presentation of oral history, Captain Dr. Cann shows how a counterinsurgency war could be fought. To my knowledge, this is the best book in English on the subject.—Brigadier-General Renato F. Marques Pinto^LFormer Chief of Military Intelligence, Angola^Land former Army Chief of Staff, Mozambique^R