This book describes the logistical systems and requirements of the North Korean People's Army and Chinese Communist forces during the Korean War.
This book describes the logistical systems and requirements of the North Korean People's Army and Chinese Communist forces during the Korean War. The author examines the performance of the Communist logistical system from June 1950 to July 1953, explaining the failure of the United Nations air interdiction campaign in terms of the constant improvement of Communist logistical capabilities. The author concludes that the United Nations air force damaged, but was unable to destroy, the Communist distribution system. The North Koreans and Chinese Communists were able to supply their front line units sufficiently to enable them to conduct a strong static defense, which prevented a United Nations victory, and in the last months of the war, to mount strong, sustained offensive actions.
Illustrations Preface The Logistics Environment Introduction The Physical Environment NKPA-CCF Logistical Doctrine and Organization NKPA-CCF Supply, Maintenance, and Storage System NKPA and CCF Supply Requirements NKPA-CCF Distribution Systems UNC Interdiction and NKPA-CCF Logistics Advances and Retreats, June 1950-July 1951 Stalemate, July 1951-July 1953 Conclusion Appendix A: NKPA-CCF Order of Battle in Korea Notes Appendix B: Characteristics of NKPA-CCF Logistical Vehicles Notes Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols Selected Bibliography Index